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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this action by virtue
of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(j) (Supp. 1988).
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third District
Court awarding Plaintiff insurance benefits for the accidental
death of her husband.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issue presented for review is whether the
death of Bryce Hardy from narcotic intoxication was a death by
accident within the meaning of the Beneficial Life policy in
question.

Plaintiff acknowledges that in reviewing a

determination made on the basis of stipulated facts this Court
is not bound by the trial court's findings of fact nor
conclusions of law.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a contract action wherein the Plaintiff
claimed accidental death benefits arising from the death of her
husband from narcotic intoxication.

The matter was presented

to the trial court on stipulated facts and the Court entered
judgment for the Plaintiff on May 9, 1988.
Bryce Hardy died on September 10, 1981 after taking an

undetermined amount of narcotics.

In the evening prior to his

death, Mr. Hardy did not appear anxious or depressed and he
made no statements reflecting any intention to take his own
life.

His activities were routine and included making

preparations for the next day's work, reading to his children
and watching television.
Prior to his death, Mr. Hardy had been diagnosed as
suffering from, and received treatment for, drug dependency.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah law recognizes that a death is accidental if,
from the viewpoint of the insured, it is not the intended or
expected result of the insured's own conduct at the time of his
death.

Our Supreme Court has expressly disavowed the notion

that an insured's reckless conduct, which creates a foreseeable
risk of serious harm or death, renders a death resulting from
such conduct nonaccidental.

In Utah, as in the majority of

jurisdictions which have considered the question, death from an
unintentional overdose of drugs is an accidental death.
ARGUMENT
BRYCE HARDY DIED AS THE RESULT OF AN
ACCIDENTAL OVERDOSE OF NARCOTICS
Bryce Hardy died on September 10, 1981 from the toxic
effects of the ingestion of narcotics.

There is no evidence

that he knew, expected, or should have known that his actions
on that date would cause his death.

Beneficial Life is asking

this Court to make a factual finding which is contrary to the

evidence and is doing so on the basis of the unstated premise
that anyone who engages in illegal drug usage has to be deemed
to have intended to die by virtue of that conduct.
The entire argument of the Defendant is predicated
upon the false premise that Bryce Hardy somehow died as the
result of a pattern of drug abuse.

He did not.

He died from

the toxic effects of a single episode of narcotic ingestion.
There is absolutely no evidence that his prior history of drug
use played any part whatsoever in his death.

His death was

not, as implied by the Defendant, the culmination of years of
addiction.

It was the result of one overdose.

Reference to '

the warnings Mr. Hardy had received that drug use could be
expected to "shorten his life" in no way speaks to the issue of
whether Mr. Hardy expected to die on September 10, 1981, which
is the sole issue presented by this appeal.

The Defendant's

argument that Mr. Hardy's conduct, in continuing to use drugs
despite warnings that he should not do so, was so reckless as
to deprive his death of an accidental character has been
expressly repudiated in Utah.
In Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d
410 (Utah, 1983), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the notion
that reckless conduct which gives rise to a foreseeable risk of
serious injury or death precludes a resulting death from being
accidental.

Noting that insurance contracts are construed from

the point of view of the average man, the Court pointed out

-3-

that the "layman views an accident as any result which is not
expected."

669 P.2d at 416.

"Expected/' as the Court

acknowledged, is a term that implies a "high degree of
certainty."
Thus, since the common meaning of the
term [accident] is defined in terms of
whether the event was naturally and probably
expected or anticipated by the insured, it
is that definition which must be applied,
and not one founded on foreseeability.
That construction is consistent with
the rule that contract language should be
"construed against the party who drew it and
especially this is so in the case of
contracts which are sold widely to the
average man."
The "unexpected event" standard laid
down in Richards as to what constitutes an
accident includes not only death resulting
from conduct of the insured which is
negligent, but also death resulting from an
insured's conduct which is reckless.
669 P.2d at 416-17 (citations omitted).
The notion that Mr. Hardy must have intended his death
because he had been warned of the dangers associated with
taking drugs is directly rebutted by the Defendant's own
recitation of Mr. Hardy's extensive experience with taking
drugs without death following.

This history, standing alone,

raises the inference that Mr. Hardy would not believe, with a
"high degree of certainty," that doing only what he had been
doing for some years would cause his death on the date in
question.

While an individual could be warned repeatedly that

drunk driving very well might cause a fatal accident, such
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admonition in no way renders a death caused by drunk driving on
a particular occasion a nonaccidental death.
Moralizing about the lack of propriety involved in
drug abuse does not alter the fact that if Mr. Hardy did not
intend or expect his actions on the day in question to cause
his death, then his death was accidental within the meaning of
the contract.

As noted by the Court in Miller v. Continental

Ins. Co., 407 N.Y.2d 675, 358 N.E.2d 258 (1976):
while it may be inferred that the decedent's
introduction of heroin into his body was
intentional, there is no proof whatsoever
that he intended it to have fatal
consequences or even that he was aware of
the fact that the particular dose of heroin
which he was taking at the time posed any
threat of death at all. In today's society,
the knowledge has been forced upon us that
heroin and other drugs are most often taken
to induce a temporary aura of relaxation and
well-being completely incompatible with any
desire on the part of their users to depart
life. When we add to that the fact that the
brotherly admonition that "it is bad for
you" is likely to make as small an
impression on drug users as do, for example,
the regularly ignored official government
warnings about the dire effect of cigarette
smoking, can it be said that the trial court
did not have the right to conclude that
Douglas Miller, in injecting drugs into his
bloodstream, did so without any thought of
death in mind? We think not.
358 N.E.2d at 259.
Courts addressing the question of whether a drug
overdose constitutes an accident within the meaning of a policy
of insurance have repeatedly noted that insurance companies are
free to incorporate policy exclusions for death from drug
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overdose and if they don't elect to do so, the courts should
not write such an exclusion into the policy.

For example,

Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1967), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an insured's voluntary
exposure to the risks associated with taking narcotics was not
a defense to an accidental death claim.

The Court held that

death from an overdose of narcotics, absent evidence of
suicidal intent, was accidental.
While we see nothing improper in a
contractual limitation which would disclaim
coverage in cases such as the instant one,
we are unwilling to recognize such a
restriction on the basis of the ambiguous
language contained in this policy which the
company knew was susceptible of different
interpretations. Andrew Beckham's policy
provided for double indemnity in the event
of an accidental death. "When a man has
died in such a way that his death is spoken
of as an accident, he has died because of an
accident. . ."
225 A.2d at 537 (citations omitted).

In a concurring opinion,

Justice Musmanno described eloquently the reasons why deaths
from dangerous conduct are nonetheless deaths by accident.
The person who drives his automobile at
100 miles per hour on a congested highway
is, in metamorphical language, "committing
suicide," but if he is killed it does not
legally or logically follow that he actually
intended to take his life. Many if not
perhaps most, fatalities of a violent
character, (where crime is not involved) are
due to poor reasoning, neglectful conduct,
or a reckless attitude on the part of the
deceased. An insomniac takes too many
sleeping pills because he yearns to erase
with a weary arm the slate of exhaustion,
pain or sorrow; the swimmer dives into a
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shallow pool, seeking the exhilaration of
cooling waters to drown the fatigue of a
tired and weary body; a pedestrian runs
across the street in front of a speeding
street car because he sees on the other side
of the thoroughfare a dear friend whose
companionship will be medicine to his
loneliness and despair. Where death results
in such cases the result is accidental even
though the deceased voluntarily rode the
thunderbolt which killed him.
Andrew Beckham took an overdose of
narcotics. Anyone who has read the classic
Confessions of an English Opium Eater by
Thomas DeQuincy will understand the
beguiling heaven toward which Beckham was
directing his steps as he followed the
inviting primrose path into the soothing
dreams of nepenthe.
Andrew Beckham wanted to live, if only
to dive again into the shallow pool of
artificial exhilaration, if only to cross
the street to embrace the morphine
sweetheart of heart's ease. He used bad
judgment, he was reckless, he did not want
to bring bereavement and sadness to his
mother, and it is comforting to know that
she will not be denied the money he provided
to help her along the remainder of her
lonely journey when he, even through his own
negligence, involuntarily left her.
225 A.2d at 537-38 (Musmanno, J., concurring).
There is virtual unanimity in jurisdictions, like
Utah, which have abandoned distinctions between "accidental
means" and "accidental results" and tests predicated on
foreseeability of result, that drug overdoses resulting in
death are accidents.

For example, in O'Toole v. New York Life

Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1982), the Court noted that it
was within the insurance company's power to exclude coverage

for death from overdose and if it did not do so then neither
should the courts.
In the instant case, the policy
excluded death by suicide, but an exclusion
for death resulting from the selfadministration of drugs was not stated. In
addition, the insurance contract did not
deny benefits if the insured died during the
commission of an unlawful act. Under these
circumstances, the question whether the
policy extended coverage in this type of
case is, at best, unclear. Consequently,
the trial court was correct in awarding the
accidental death sum to the plaintiffs, for
it is "hornbook law that whenever ambiguity
is found in the provisions of an insurance
contract, such ambiguity will be resolved in
favor of the insured so as to provide him
with the broadest coverage consistent with a
reasonable interpretation of the contract."
671 F.2d at 915 (citations omitted).
In Marsh v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Inc., 70
Ill.App.3d 790, 388 N.E.2d 1121 (1979), an Illinois Court of
Appeals held that, as a matter of law, death from an unintended
overdose of heroin was a death by accident.

The Court

specifically rejected the insurer's contention that the death
was not accidental because it was not "unexpected, unusual or
unforeseen."

The Court held that use of a foreseeability test

like that employed in tort or criminal law was simply
inappropriate in a case construing an insurance policy.

Noting

that the insured's conduct was undoubtedly reckless and his
death foreseeable, the Court nonetheless held it to be
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for interpreting accident policies in Hoffman, supra.

The

test, as set forth above, is whether the result was actually
expected by the insured at the time of the conduct in
question.

If there is no direct evidence of the insured's

intent, then the common law presumption against suicide
precludes a finding of actions on the part of the insured by
which he "expected" he was going to cause his own death.

See,

e.g., Carter v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259
(1925).
The Defendant wants this Court to create a policy
exclusion it chose to omit and to do so by finding that
Mr. Hardy's failure to heed the warnings of others that he
should avoid taking narcotics is the equivalent of intending to
die on each occasion when he took drugs, including the last.
The irony of this argument is that Mr. Hardy had learned from
his own addiction that he could take drugs repeatedly without
death ensuing as an immediate consequence.

Given his own

history of drug use, it cannot be logically inferred that
Mr. Hardy "expected" death to follow any episode of drug
"misuse" because there had been many (as the Defendant itself
points out) when it had not.

It is this experience which would

define Mr. Hardy's expectation, not the "foreseeability" of his
life being shortened by an unexpected overdose.
Although the law frequently employs the
proposition that one intends the natural and
probable results of his conduct in tort and
criminal law, as well as other areas of the
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CONCLUSION
Beneficial Life urges this Court to find that Bryce
Hardy must have intended to die on September 10, 1981 because
he had been previously warned that taking drugs could shorten
his life.

Therefore, it argues, Mr. Hardy's death was the

natural product of his own conduct which he must be presumed to
have intended and not an accident.

This logic has been

rejected in Utah, and virtually every other jurisdiction,
because it substitutes an after the fact evaluation of events
for that which the insured actually made.

In his famous

dissent in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491
(1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting), which has now been uniformly
accepted as a correct statement of the law, Justice Cardozo
noted that every result in life follows as a "natural and
probable" consequence of some intentional act but "accidents"
occur nonetheless.
"Probably it is true to say that in the
strictest sense and dealing with the region
of physical nature there is no such thing as
an accident." . . . On the other hand, the
average man is convinced that there is, and
so certainly is the man who takes out a
policy of accident insurance. It is his
reading of the policy that is to be accepted
as our guide, with the help of the
established rule that ambiguities and
uncertainties are to be resolved against the
company.
291 U.S. at 499 (citations omitted).
Given this view of the proper interpretation of

insur?r?r° policies

court;, , w find deaths resulting from ail

natur*.

•-"- -

the resu ."

..: •-::

'

decider:

diiu ilipqn,] conduct tv, be
- absence oi K «\i\rr r\ i • evrlHi'K H

it? i n s u r ^ - r t t i ^ i i v intended or expected t o cause h i s own
ucdu, oy ^ i c l
« ^+\\ o e t t e i

Turfld should have
i

: e t e n s e r o i a v.. ,-inp«uj, L.idt couid e a s i l y iitivi-1

* rr IXOJV and e x c i u d e c -~

:. coverage if it oo

chose,
DATED this

/JHL

day of October, 1988. •
PRINCE

YEATES & GELDZAHLER

M. DaViLd Eckersl(
x
rnevs for Plaintiff/Respondent
MAILING
I *er^-

CERTIFICATE

prtifv that, or, t :..? / %^4, day nf October
•r^pa:d, four true and

• trect

"ipieF

f

,e r ,: t -,. , rig RLSFt.-NDEN'. .! BKJhl

George J , Romney
David J, Holdsworth
ROMNEY & CONDIE
700 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East So. Temple
Salt LaVf- ~ity, UT 84"
Attori:e\ - ~" TV*: *--'* ;

008 7d
101888

-13

>

h^

